stag hunt example international relations

David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. While there is certainly theoretical value in creating a single model that can account for all factors and answer all questions inherent to the AI Coordination Problem, this is likely not tractable or useful to attempt at least with human hands and minds alone. For example, if the players could flip a coin before choosing their strategies, they might agree to correlate their strategies based on the coin flip by, say, choosing ballet in the event of heads and prize fight in the event of tails. Hunting stags is most beneficial for society but requires a . These are a few basic examples of modeling IR problems with game theory. [21] Jackie Snow, Algorithms are making American inequality worse, MIT Technology Review, January 26, 2018, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/; The Boston Consulting Group & Sutton Trust, The State of Social mobility in the UK, July 2017, https://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BCGSocial-Mobility-report-full-version_WEB_FINAL-1.pdf. [18] Deena Zaidi, The 3 most valuable applications of AI in health care, VentureBeat, April 22, 2018, https://venturebeat.com/2018/04/22/the-3-most-valuable-applications-of-ai-in-health-care/. Stag hunt definition: a hunt carried out to find and kill stags | Meaning, pronunciation, translations and examples The complex machinations required to create a lasting peace may well be under way, but any viable agreementand the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces that would entailrequires an Afghan government capable of holding its ground on behalf of its citizens and in the ongoing struggle against violent extremism. Intuition and Deliberation in the Stag Hunt Game - Nature For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI. In international relations, countries are the participants in the stag hunt. Examples of the stag hunt [ edit] The original stag hunt dilemma is as follows: a group of hunters have tracked a large stag, and found it to follow a certain path. The following subsection further examines these relationships and simulates scenarios in which each coordination model would be most likely. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. This table contains a sample ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Stag Hunt game. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a new game of revenge. If one side cooperates with and one side defects from the AI Coordination Regime, we can expect their payoffs to be expressed as follows (here we assume Actor A defects while Actor B cooperates): For the defector (here, Actor A), the benefit from an AI Coordination Regime consists of the probability that they believe such a regime would achieve a beneficial AI times Actor As perceived benefit of receiving AI with distributional considerations [P_(b|A) (AB)b_Ad_A]. When looking at these components in detail, however, we see that the anticipated benefits and harms are linked to whether the actors cooperate or defect from an AI Coordination Regime. Not wanting to miss out on the high geopolitical drama, Moscow invited Afghanistans former president, Hamid Karzai, and a cohort of powerful elitesamong them rivals of the current presidentto sit down with a Taliban delegation last week. As the infighting continues, the impulse to forego the elusive stag in favor of the rabbits on offer will grow stronger by the day. We have recently seen an increase in media acknowledgement of the benefits of artificial intelligence (AI), as well as the negative social implications that can arise from its development. Additionally, both actors perceive the potential returns to developing AI to be greater than the potential harms. Does a more optimistic/pessimistic perception of an actors own or opponents capabilities affect which game model they adopt? Sharp's consent theory of power is the most well articulated connection between nonviolent action and power theory, yet it has some serious shortcomings, especially in dealing with systems not fitting a ruler-subject dichotomy, such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and patriarchy. Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues. \wb94W(F}pYY"[17/x(K+jf+M)S_3ZP7~Nj\TgTId=/o7Mx{a[ K} First, I survey the relevant background of AI development and coordination by summarizing the literature on the expected benefits and harms from developing AI and what actors are relevant in an international safety context. Hume's second example involves two neighbors wishing to drain a meadow. For example, if the two international actors cooperate with one another, we can expect some reduction in individual payoffs if both sides agree to distribute benefits amongst each other. [22] Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, and Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, ProPublica, May 23, 2016 https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing. Table 2. What are some good examples of coordination games? [7] Aumann concluded that in this game "agreement has no effect, one way or the other." The payoff matrix is displayed as Table 12. [11] In our everyday lives, we store AI technology as voice assistants in our pockets[12] and as vehicle controllers in our garages. The remainder of this subsection looks at numerical simulations that result in each of the four models and discusses potential real-world hypotheticals these simulations might reflect. The game is a prototype of the social contract. Carol M. Rose argues that the stag hunt theory is useful in 'law and humanities' theory. (e.g., including games such as Chicken and Stag Hunt). This is why international tradenegotiationsare often tense and difficult. hVN0ii ipv@B\Z7 'Q{6A"@](v`Q(TJ}Px^AYbA`Z&gh'{HoF4 JQb&b`#B$03an8"3V0yFZbwonu#xZ? But what is even more interesting (even despairing) is, when the situation is more localized and with a smaller network of acquainted people, most players still choose to hunt the hare as opposed to working together to hunt the stag. Table 6 Payoff Matrix for AI Coordination Scenarios, Where P_h (A)h [D,D]>P_h (A)h [D,C]>P_h (AB)h [C,C]. No payoffs (that satisfy the above conditions including risk dominance) can generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where Stag is played with a probability higher than one half. For example, suppose we have a prisoner's dilemma as pictured in Figure 3. 2020 Yale International Relations Association | New Haven, CT, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, Automation, and the Economy, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, Interview with YPG volunteer soldier Brace Belden, Shaping Saddam: How the Media Mythologized A Monster Honorable Mention, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a beneficial AI, Percent of benefits Actor A can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Percent of benefits Actor B can expect to receive from an AI Coordination Regime, Actor As perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Actor Bs perceived utility from developing beneficial AI, Probability Actor A believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes Actor A will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes Actor B will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes it will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor A believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Probability Actor B believes AI Coordination Regime will develop a harmful AI, Actor As perceived harm from developing a harmful AI, Actor Bs perceived harm from developing a harmful AI. [25] For more on the existential risks of Superintelligence, see Bostrom (2014) at Chapters 6 and 8. 0000016685 00000 n Absolute gains looks at the total effect of the decision while relative gains only looks at the individual gains in respect to others. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world., China, Russia, soon all countries w strong computer science. In order to mitigate or prevent the deleterious effects of arms races, international relations scholars have also studied the dynamics that surround arms control agreements and the conditions under which actors might coordinate with one another. 0000006229 00000 n Actor As preference order: DC > CC > CD > DD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DC > DD. In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Like the hunters in the woods, Afghanistans political elites have a great deal, at least theoretically, to gain from sticking together. Outline a basic understanding of what the discipline of International Relations is about, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778): Parable of the Stag Hunt. They are the only body responsible for their own protection. From that moment on, the tenuous bonds keeping together the larger band of weary, untrusting hunters will break and the stag will be lost. Half a stag is better than a brace of rabbits, but the stag will only be brought down with a . 0000000016 00000 n 695 20 This is taken to be an important analogy for social cooperation. As a result, this could reduce a rival actors perceived relative benefits gained from developing AI. [51] An analogous scenario in the context of the AI Coordination Problem could be if both international actors have developed, but not yet unleashed an ASI, where knowledge of whether the technology will be beneficial or harmful is still uncertain. Table 11. might complicate coordination efforts. [21] Moreover, racist algorithms[22] and lethal autonomous weapons systems[23] force us to grapple with difficult ethical questions as we apply AI to more society realms. Combining both countries economic and technical ecosystem with government pressures to develop AI, it is reasonable to conceive of an AI race primarily dominated by these two international actors. I discuss in this final section the relevant policy and strategic implications this theory has on achieving international AI coordination, and assess the strengths and limitations of the theory outlined above in practice. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 8. Both games are games of cooperation, but in the Stag-hunt there is hope you can get to the "good" outcome. Both nations can benefit by working together and signing the agreement. Name four key thinkers of the theory of non-violent resistance, Gandhi, martin luther king, malcon X, cesar chavex. The Stag Hunt - YouTube As such, Chicken scenarios are unlikely to greatly affect AI coordination strategies but are still important to consider as a possibility nonetheless. Two players, simultaneous decisions. These two concepts refer to how states will act in the international community. The Stag Hunt UCI School of Social Sciences, Example of stag hunt in international relations, on Example of stag hunt in international relations, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stag_Hunt_Mosaic, example of application letter for sales representative, Example of selection criteria planning and organising, Example sentences with the word detrimental, Manual de access 2010 avanzado pdf en espanol gratis. Battle of the sexes (game theory) - Wikipedia But, at various critical junctures, including the countrys highly contentious presidential elections in 2009 and 2014, rivals have ultimately opted to stick with the state rather than contest it. 0000018184 00000 n Finally, Jervis[40] also highlights the security dilemma where increases in an actors security can inherently lead to the decreased security of a rival state. 'The "liberal democratic peace" thesis puts the nail into the coffin of Kenneth Waltz's claim that wars are principally caused by the anarchical nature of the international system.' One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. 0000003638 00000 n Uses of Game Theory in International Relations In this scenario, however, both actors can also anticipate to the receive additional anticipated harm from the defector pursuing their own AI development outside of the regime. Different social/cultural systems are prone to clash. War is anarchic, and intervening actors can sometimes help to mitigate the chaos. Here, values are measured in utility. For example, it is unlikely that even the actor themselves will be able to effectively quantify their perception of capacity, riskiness, magnitude of risk, or magnitude of benefits. The Stag Hunt represents an example of compensation structure in theory. Beding (2008), but also in international relations (Jervis 1978) and macroeconomics (Bryant 1994). Any individual move to capture a rabbit will guarantee a small meal for the defector but ensure the loss of the bigger, shared bounty. Rousseau recognized that the ine cient outcome hunting hare may result, just as conict can result in the security dilemma, and proceeded to provide philosophical arguments in favor of the outcome where both hunters . Together, the likelihood of winning and the likelihood of lagging = 1. An approximation of a Stag Hunt in international relations would be an international treaty such as the Paris Climate Accords, where the protective benefits of environmental regulation from the harms of climate change (in theory) outweigh the benefits of economic gain from defecting. international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an As a result, concerns have been raised that such a race could create incentives to skimp on safety. The stag hunt differs from the prisoner's dilemma in that there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria:[2] one where both players cooperate, and one where both players defect. The best response correspondences are pictured here. Civilians and civilian objects are protected under the laws of armed conflict by the principle of distinction. On the other hand, real life examples of poorly designed compensation structures that create organizational inefficiencies and hinder success are not uncommon. [15] Sam Byford, AlphaGo beats Lee Se-dol again to take Google DeepMind Challenge series, The Verge, March 12, 2016, https://www.theverge.com/2016/3/12/11210650/alphago-deepmind-go-match-3-result. Is human security a useful approach to security? So it seems that, while we still are motivated by own self-interest, the addition of social dynamics to the two-person Stag Hunt game leads to a tendency of most people agreeing to hunt the stag. If security increases cant be distinguished as purely defensive, this decreases instability. What are the two exceptions to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter? This is the third technology revolution., Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind. If they both work to drain it they will be successful, but if either fails to do his part the meadow will not be drained. > On a separate piece of paper, write the best possible answer for each one. In this article, we employ a class of symmetric, ordinal 2 2 games including the frequently studied Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag Hunt to model the stability of the social contract in the face of catastrophic changes in social relations. International Relations of Asia & US Foreign Policy. [10] AI expert Andrew Ng says AI is the new electricity | Disrupt SF 2017, TechCrunch Disrupt SF 2017, TechCrunch, September 20, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSCka8vXaJc. These strategies are not meant to be exhaustive by any means, but hopefully show how the outlined theory might provide practical use and motivate further research and analysis. [35] Outlining what this Coordination Regime might look like could be the topic of future research, although potential desiderata could include legitimacy, neutrality, accountability, and technical capacity; see Allan Dafoe, Cooperation, Legitimacy, and Governance in AI Development, Working Paper (2016). International Cooperation Theory and International Institutions [30], Today, government actors have already expressed great interest in AI as a transformative technology. If participation is not universal, they cannot surround the stag and it escapes, leaving everyone that hunted stag hungry. startxref [25] In a particularly telling quote, Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, and Frank Wilczek foreshadow this stark risk: One can imagine such technology outsmarting financial markets, out-inventing human researchers, out-manipulating human leaders, and developing weapons we cannot even understand. In recent times, more doctrinal exceptions to Article 2(4) such as anticipatory self defence (especially after the events of 9/11) and humanitarian intervention. To be sustained, a regime of racial oppression requires cooperation. [7] E.g. Intriligator and Brito[38] argue that qualitative/technological races can lead to greater instability than quantitative races. HW?n9*K$kBOQiBo1d\QlQ%AAW\gQV#j^KRmEB^]L6Rw4muu.G]a>[U/h;@ip|=PS[nyfGI0YD+FK:or+:=y&4i'kvC As is customary in game theory, the first number in each cell represents how desirable the outcome is for Row (in this case, Actor A), and the second number represents how desirable the same outcome is for Column (Actor B). [45] Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail, (Cornell Univ. Here, this is expressed as P_(h|A or B) (A)h_(A or B). In this paper, I develop a simple theory to explain whether two international actors are likely to cooperate or compete in developing AI and analyze what variables factor into this assessment. Under which four circumstances does the new norm of the 'Responsibility to Protect' arise? In these abstractions, we assume two utility-maximizing actors with perfect information about each others preferences and behaviors. Finally, the paper will consider some of the practical limitations of the theory. arguing that territorial conflicts in international relations follow a strategic logic but one defined by the cost-benefit calculations that . He found various theories being proposed, suggesting a level analysis problem. How can the security dilemma be mitigated and transcended? Nonetheless many would call this game a stag hunt. [4] In international law, countries are the participants in a stag hunt. Meanwhile, both actors can still expect to receive the anticipated harm that arises from a Coordination Regime [P_(h|A or B) (AB)h_(A or B)]. But who can we expect to open the Box? The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality : If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would h ave gone off in pursuit . The primary difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken, however, is that both actors failing to cooperate is the least desired outcome of the game. Instead, each hunter should separately choose the more ambitious and far more rewarding goal of getting the stag, thereby giving up some autonomy in exchange for the other hunter's cooperation and added might. To what extent does today's mainstream media provide us with an objective view of war? For example, one prisone r may seemingly betray the other , but without losing the other's trust. Relative vs. Absolute Gains - Intro to International Relations If all the hunters work together, they can kill the stag and all eat. N-person stag hunt dilemmas Jorge M. Pachecol'*, Francisco C. Santos2, Max O. Souza3 and Brian Skyrms4 . Another proposed principle of rationality ("maximin") suggests that I ought to consider the worst payoff I could obtain under any course of action, and choose that action that maximizes . In their paper, the authors suggest Both the game that underlies an arms race and the conditions under which it is conducted can dramatically affect the success of any strategy designed to end it[58]. This allows for coordination, and enables players to move from the strategy with the lowest combined payoff (both cheat) to the strategy with the highest combined payoff (both cooperate). A common example of the Prisoners Dilemma in IR is trade agreements. Stag hunt definition and meaning | Collins English Dictionary Due to the potential global harms developing AI can cause, it would be reasonable to assume that government actors would try impose safety measures and regulations on actors developing AI, and perhaps even coordinate on an international scale to ensure that all actors developing AI might cooperate under an AI Coordination Regime[35] that sets, monitors, and enforces standards to maximize safety. This iterated structure creates an incentive to cooperate; cheating in the first round significantly reduces the likelihood that the other player will trust one enough to attempt to cooperate in the future. 15. It would be much better for each hunter, acting individually, to give up total autonomy and minimal risk, which brings only the small reward of the hare. Game Theory 101: The Complete William Spaniel shows how to solve the Stag Hunt using pure strategy Nash equilibrium. HtV]o6*l_\Ek=2m"H)$]feV%I,/i~==_&UA0K=~=,M%p5H|UJto%}=#%}U[-=nh}y)bhQ:*&#HzF1"T!G i/I|P&(Jt92B5*rhA"4 The current landscape suggests that AI development is being led by two main international actors: China and the United States. Although Section 2 describes to some capacity that this might be a likely event with the U.S. and China, it is still conceivable that an additional international actor can move into the fray and complicate coordination efforts. (Pergamon Press: 1985). ? PDF The Stag Hunt - University of California, Irvine Additional readings provide insight on arms characteristics that impact race dynamics. Based on the values that each actor assigns to their payoff variables, we can expect different coordination models (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) to arise. As of 2017, there were 193 member-states of the international system as recognized by the United Nations. Therefore, if it is likely that both actors perceive to be in a state of Prisoners Dilemma when deciding whether to agree on AI, strategic resources should be especially allocated to addressing this vulnerability. It truly takes a village, to whom this paper is dedicated. Still, predicting these values and forecasting probabilities based on information we do have is valuable and should not be ignored solely because it is not perfect information. Leanna Litsch, Kabul Security Force Public Affairs. f(x)={323(4xx2)0if0x4otherwise. (PDF) THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS I-II - ResearchGate 1. hRj0pq%[a00a IIR~>jzNTDLC=Qm=,e-[Vi?kCE"X~5eyE]/2z))!6fqfx6sHD8&: s>)Mg 5>6v9\s7U [6] Moreover, speculative accounts of competition and arms races have begun to increase in prominence[7], while state actors have begun to take steps that seem to support this assessment. For example, in a scenario where the United States and Russia are competing to be the one to land on the moon first, the stag hunt would allow the two countries to work together to achieve this goal when they would have gone their separate ways and done the lunar landing on their own. For Rousseau, in his famous parable of the stag hunt, war is inevitable because of the security dilemma and the lack of trust between states. For example, Stag Hunts are likely to occur when the perceived harm of developing a harmful AI is significantly greater than the perceived benefit that comes from a beneficial AI . One is the coordination of slime molds. We are all familiar with the basic Prisoners Dilemma. In this game "each player always prefers the other to play c, no matter what he himself plays. Prisoners Dilemma, Stag Hunt, Battle of the Sexes, and Chicken are discussed in our text. Here, both actors demonstrate high uncertainty about whether they will develop a beneficial or harmful AI alone (both Actors see the likelihood as a 50/50 split), but they perceive the potential benefits of AI to be slightly greater than the potential harms. In the long term, environmental regulation in theory protects us all, but even if most of the countries sign the treaty and regulate, some like China and the US will not forsovereigntyreasons, or because they areexperiencinggreat economic gain.
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